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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
FRANCISCO TINOCO,

Case No. 920665-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), and Utah R. Crim.
P. 26(2)(a), whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action
may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment and
conviction for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony,

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or
in Addendum A:
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3)
Code Ann. § 76-5-102
Code Ann. § 76-5-103
R. Crim. P. 19(c)
R. Evid. 103(d)

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in not giving Mr. Tinoco's

proposed instructions relating to the meaning of attempt, requests
which would have enabled the jury to focus on the applicable mens
rea?

"Because an appeal challenging the refusal to give jury

instructions presents questions of law only, we grant no particular
deference to the trial court's rulings.w

Carpet Barn v. State, 786

P.2d 770, 775 (Utah App. 1990); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 798
(Utah 1991); accord State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992) (on
"matter[s] of statutory interpretation[,] . . . we review the trial
court's ruling for correctness and give no deference to its
conclusions").
2.

Was Mr. Tinoco improperly convicted of a crime which was

a legal impossibility?

See State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah

1992) (questions of law are reviewed for correctness); State v.
Haston, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (1993) (per curiam).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-103.

(R 136).

The State also had charged defendant/

appellant Francisco Tinoco with the greater offense, attempted
criminal homicide.

(R 7-8).

The jury, though, only adjudged him

guilty of the lesser included offense.
August 20, 1992).
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-

(R 132, 134) (verdict dated

At the sentencing proceedings, held on September 21, 1992,
(R 613), the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson ordered Mr. Tinoco to serve
an indeterminate term of zero-to-five years in the Utah State
Prison, together with various court ordered amounts.

(R 136).

The

sentence was enhanced by, and ran consecutively to, another five
year term for the use of a firearm.
(R 622).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3).

Commitment began forthwith.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
On or about April 20, 1992, Rogellio Quinones, who was a

friend of Francisco Tinoco, visited Francisco just outside his
home.

(R 497).

Accompanying Quinones was Jesus Rodriguez Estrada,

a person not close to Francisco.

(R 497).

Jesus began talking

about guns and asked Francisco to purchase some.

(R 499)•

Francisco declined, feeling uncomfortable with Jesus.

(R 500-01).

Francisco went inside his residence.
A while later, Rogellio and Jesus entered Francisco's home
whereupon Jesus noticed Francisco's shotgun, positioned by his
sofa.

Jesus again talked about guns that he wanted to sell.

(R 508).

Jesus also expressed an interest in Francisco's gun,

indicating that he wanted to grab it.

(R 509).

Jesus, who had been drinking, became belligerent and angry,
calling Francisco a "faggot".

(R 509).

Jesus chided Francisco for

1
"Because the facts are unimportant to the issue before
us [a legal question], we will summarize them briefly." State v.
Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992).
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-

having weapons when he "didn't have the guts to use them."
(R 512).

Then, in a threatening manner, Jesus stood up and lunged

at Francisco.

(R 462, 512). Francisco reacted, grabbing the gun

and shooting Jesus in the left upper arm and chest.

(R 276,

512-15).
By comparison, the State claimed that Francisco was on his
sofa, "pumping11 the shotgun, putting the shells in and taking them
out when Jesus entered the residence.

(R 312).

Jesus was under the

impression that Francisco wanted to fight and spoke about different
types of weapons.

(R 310-11).

Jesus then decided to leave and started walking towards the
door.

(R 312).

Francisco apparently said something in Spanish,

pointed the gun at Jesus (who had turned around) and fired the gun.
(R 312).
The State argued that Francisco Tinoco attempted to murder
or seriously injure Jesus Rodriguez Estrada.

(R 111, 114-16, 570,

571, 578, 582). Mr. Tinoco explained that he had only acted in
self-defense.

(R 584).

At issue here are the propriety of the jury

instructions.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred when it refused to give Mr. Tinoco's
proposed changes to the jury instructions.

The proposals would have

better defined the applicable mental state pertinent to the elements
of the charged offenses.

Without the proposed changes, the

instructions contradicted themselves and left the jury with

4

inadequate guidance as to which of the listed mens rea they were
required to find.

The improperly worded instructions also allowed

the jury to find that Mr. Tinoco attempted a reckless act.

Such a

result is a legal impossibility.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO GIVE
APPELLANTS REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
At the close of trial, the court instructed the jury on,
inter alia, the crimes of attempted criminal homicide, (R 96, 111),
and the lesser included offense of aggravated assault.
The jury acquitted Mr. Tinoco of the greater offense.

(R 115).
(R 111, 115).

While the jury did convict him of the lesser offense, the
terms incorporated therein were improperly defined.

One aggravated

assault instruction, jury instruction 22 stated, WA person commits
Aggravated Assault if that person commits assault and
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) uses a dangerous weapon or other means or force likely to
produce death or serious bodily injury."

(R 114) (emphasis added)

(instruction 22) (attached as Addendum B); Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-103.
Another aggravated assault instruction similarly required
proof of an assault, but it also included the "recklessly" and
"knowingly" mental states.
Addendum C).

(R 115) (instruction 23) (attached as

Instruction 23 required the jury to find:
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1. That on or about the 21st day of April of 1992
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant
Francisco Tinoco assaulted Jesus Rodriguez; and
2. That he did so by the use of a dangerous weapon
or other means or force likely to produce death or
serious bodily injury;
3. That the said defendant did so recklessly,
intentionally or knowingly; and
4. That the defendant did so unlawfully and
without legal justification.
(R 115) (emphasis added).
Instruction 24 defines assault.
Addendum D ) .

(R 116) (attached as

The instruction reads, inter alia;

11

Assault" is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force
do bodily injury to another; or
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show
force or violence, to do bodily injury
(c) an act, committed with unlawful
violence, that causes bodily injury to

or violence, to
of immediate
to another; or
force or
another.

(R 116) (emphasis added) (Addendum D ) ; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.
The initial issue centers around the meaning of attempt, as
set forth in subsection (a) of jury instruction 24.

(R 116).

Mr. Tinoco requested the court to insert the word, "intentionally",
between the words, "to" and "do".

(R 567). He explained that

attempt "requires intentional conduct."

(R 567).

"[0]ne cannot be

guilty of an attempt to commit a crime unless the necessary mens rea
of the completed crime is intentional conduct.

State v. Howell, 649

P.2d 91, 94 n.2 (Utah 1982), quoted in Vigil, 842 P.2d at 848
(emphasis added by the court).

The erroneous nature of the court's

refusal to properly instruct the jury on the meaning of attempt is
compounded when viewed "[i]n concert with [his other exception.]"

- 6
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Mr. Tinoco also sought to clarify the requisite mens rea
listed in the aggravated assault instruction.
instruction 23).

(R 567) (jury

Instruction 23 allowed the jury to choose between

any one of three potentially applicable mental states: "recklessly",
"knowingly", or "intentionally".

(R 115) (Addendum C).

Only the

"intentional" mental state corresponded with the mens rea element
for the attempt provision.
To avoid this inconsistency and to make the mental states
consistent, Mr. Tinoco requested that instruction 23 read, "That the
said defendant did so recklessly, intentionally or knowingly, which
ever is applicable."
last clause.

(R 567-68).

The court refused to add this

(R 568); (R 115).

The court's denials left the jury with instructions which
differed on the applicable mental state.

The "aggravated assault"

instruction allowed the jury to find that the act was committed
"recklessly".

(R 115) (instruction 23) (Addendum C).

However, the

subsection (a) provision of the "attempt" instruction required
intentional conduct.

(R 116) (instruction 24) (Addendum D).

Since

the necessary mens rea of "aggravated assault" could have been
reckless conduct, (R 115), and because the jury may have selected
the subsection (a) "attempt" alternative in concluding that an
"assault" occurred, (R 116), 2 the "aggravated assault" conviction

2
During closing argument, the State also asked the jury
to consider subsection (a) of the attempt provision as one of three
possible alternative which could support its verdict:
-[footnote continued on next page]
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was improperly premised.

See also Vigilf 842 P.2d at 846-47

("attempt provisions require a more culpable mental state than
recklessness for conduct that creates the substantial step11) ;
Howell. 649 P.2d at 94 n.2 ("one cannot be guilty of an attempt to
commit a crime unless the necessary mens rea of the completed crime
is intentional conduct").
The manner in which the jury was instructed improperly
allowed them to find that Mr. Tinoco attempted a reckless crime.
(R 115, 116, 567, 568); Point II. Such a result proved fatal to the
case at bar.

"Language that merely contradicts and does not explain

a constitutionally infirm instruction will not suffice to absolve
the infirmity.

A reviewing court has no way of knowing which of the

2 -[footnote continued]instruction number twenty-three [asks you to] consider
whether the State has proven that the defendant
committed aggravated assault. The Judge has read you
those elements. I will just go through a couple parts
of them. The first thing you would have to find in
order to find that there was an aggravated assault was
that there was an assault. An assault may be any one
of three different things. It can be an attempt with
unlawful force or violence to do bodily injury to
another. It can be a threat accompanied by a showing
of immediate force or violence to do bodily injury to
another, or an act committed with unlawful force or
violence that causes bodily injury to another.
(R 583-84) (emphasis added)•
If any one of the alternative theories presented to a jury
in a criminal trial is flawed, the entire verdict is invalidated.
In State v. Hastonf 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah 1993) (per curiam),
for example, the State charged defendant Haston with two valid
theories of attempted murder and one invalid alternative
-[footnote continued on next page]-
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two irreconcilable instructions the jurors applied in reaching their
verdict."

State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043, 1045-45 (Utah App. 1987)

(citing Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985)).
Clearly worded jury instructions are fundamental to the
decision making process:
Clarity is crucial to a just criminal law system.
Jurors are instructed to apply the language set forth

2 -[footnote continued]involving the "crime" of "attempted depraved indifference murder."
The jury convicted him of attempted second degree murder. 3jd.; Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1). However, "[s]ince the jury was allowed to
consider the depraved indifference alternative, as well as those
states of mind described in subsections (a) and (b) of section
76-5-203(1), defendant is entitled to a new trial." 204 Utah Adv.
Rep. 4; see also State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929 (Utah App. 1991) (the
above described jury instruction with the three alternative theories
was attached as Addendum C in Appellant Haston's opening brief,
which was filed in this Court on May 8, 1990). As noted recently by
our supreme court:
In a civil case, we will affirm a general verdict so
long as there is one legally valid theory among those
upon which the case went to the jury and sufficient
evidence to support a verdict on that theory.
However, in a criminal case the rule is to the
contrary. . . . [A] general verdict of guilty cannot
stand if the State's case was premised on the elements
of the crime and any one of those theories is flawed
or lacks the requisite evidentiary foundation. In
such circumstances, it is impossible to determine
whether the jury agreed unanimously on all of the
elements of a valid and evidentially supported theory
of the elements of the crime.
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1159 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added
and citations omitted); accord Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510,
526 (1979) ("it has long been settled that when a case is submitted
to the jury on alternative theories, the unconstitutionality of any
of the theories requires that the conviction [or verdict] be set
aside"); Shell v. Mississippi, 112 L.Ed.2d 1, 5 (1990) (per curiam)
(Marshall, J., concurring).
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in our penal statutes to determine criminal liability.
Articulating the various mental states required for the
various crimes in the Code is difficult enough
without
giving multiple meanings to the word "intent.11
State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d at 849; cf. State v. Andrus, 800 P.2d 107
(Idaho App. 1990):
When contradictory instructions are given to a jury on
a material issue, the error is prejudicial. We have
considerable faith in juries, but we cannot expect
them to discern the correct implications necessary to
reconcile contradictory instructions given by the
court, all of which are expected to be given equal
weight.
Andrusf 800 P.2d at 112. The jury instructions here failed to
adequately define the elements of aggravated assault and they also
expressed contradictory standards for the mens rea element.
conviction requires reversal.

His

See State v. Jonesf 823 P.2d 1059

(Utah 1991) (citations omitted) ("The general rule is that an
accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is
essential.

Failure to so instruct constitutes reversible error");

cf. Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hospital, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 17
(Utah 1992) (the confusion created by unclear jury instructions may
constitute a denial of the right to a fair trial).

- 10 -

POINT II
THE JURY IMPROPERLY CONVICTED APPELLANT OF AN
"OFFENSE" WHICH WAS A LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY
In a closely related argument, the improperly worded
instructions allowed the jury to convict Mr. Tinoco of a "crime,f
which was a legal impossibility.

w

[0]ne cannot be guilty of an

attempt to commit a crime unless the necessary mens rea of the
completed crime is intentional conduct."

State v. Howell, 649 P.2d

91, 94 n.l (Utah 1982), quoted in State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 848
(Utah 1992).

In other words, one cannot attempt to do a crime which

has a reckless mens rea.

Since the aggravated assault instruction

included the "reckless" mens rea and also incorporated the attempt
subsection, (R 115, 116), the jury may have concluded that he
attempted a reckless act.

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

Such a result is a legal impossibility.

See State v. Normanf 580

P.2d 237, 239-40 (Utah 1978) ("We hold that there cannot be an
attempt to commit manslaughter under [the reckless subsection] of
the statute . . . " ) ; see generally Point I.
As set forth in Norman, "attempt" and "recklessness" were
companion provisions improperly before the jury.

Even more

compelling is the situation in State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843 (Utah
1992), where the Utah Supreme Court held that an individual cannot
attempt a depraved indifference homicide.

Although depraved

indifference homicide does not require intentional conduct, it does
require a greater awareness of risks and consequences than the
reckless mental state.

Id. at 847-48.
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Despite the greater

awareness required for the depraved indifference mens rea, the Court
held, "the prosecution must prove that the defendant had a conscious
objective or desire to cause the death of another.

Because the

mental state required for depraved indifference homicide falls short
of that intent, the crime of attempted depraved indifference
homicide does not exist in Utah."

Id. at 848 (emphasis added).

In his attempt to clarify the requisite intent for the
jury, Mr. Tinoco reasoned, "as we [had] previously discussed, the
case law which talks about what kind of intent is required for any
attempted offense . . . require[s] that it be a specific intent type
of offense."

(R 567-68).

The trial court's refusal to state the

type of intent specifically pertinent to the jury's determination
rendered the crime a logical impossibility.

See Vigilf 842 P.2d

843; cf. (R 255-62) (the trial court also was apprised previously of
the similar argument regarding the impossible task of committing
"attempted depraved indifference" murder); State v. Johnson, 748
P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1987) ("A proper objection need not cite a
case; it need only fairly apprise the trial judge of the essence of
the objection").
Moreover, in situations like the case at bar where a person
has been convicted of a "crime" which was a legal impossibility, the
Utah Supreme Court has condemned such a result because "manifest
[in]just[ice]" would result if he was unnecessarily "incarcerated
for a crime which is not recognized in Utah."
Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah 1993) (per curiam).
raised at any time.

State v. Haston, 204

Such an issue may be

Id. (on certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court,

- 12 -

defendant Haston's conviction was reversed even though the "legal
impossibility" issue was not raised in the trial court and raised
initially only in a footnote of the opening brief filed in the Court
of Appeals).3
In the instant action, Mr. Tinoco's challenge goes beyond a
footnoted argument and he expressly relies on the supreme court
opinions in Haston, Vigil, and the corresponding cases which
preceded them.
cases).

See, e.g., Vigil, 842 P.2d at 848 n.5 (citing

Because the instructions presented to the jury improperly

allowed them to convict Mr. Tinoco of a a "crime" which was a
logical impossibility, it would be "manifestly unjust" for his
conviction to remain in place.4

Haston, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 4.

3
Also noteworthy is that the Haston brief filed in this
Court indicated that defense counsel actually submitted a jury
instruction which hoped to better define attempted "depraved
indifference." See Opening brief of Appellant Haston, Point II &
Addenda C, D, and E (Utah App. filed May 8, 1990).
4
See Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) ("notwithstanding a party's
failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions in order to
avoid a manifest injustice"); Utah R. Evid. 103(d) (plain error
affecting the substantial rights of a party may be corrected); State
v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043, 1046 (Utah App. 1987) (extraordinary and
constitutional error may be corrected); cf. State v. Johnson, 707
P.2d 1174, 1181 (N.M. App. 1985) ("A conviction for a non-existent
crime should not stand simply because not raised by either of the
parties"); Van Per Stappen v. Van Per Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335, 1337
(Utah App. 1991) ("the question of whether subject matter
jurisdiction exists is one of law, and the determination of whether
to set aside a judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is
reviewed without deference to the trial court" and may be attacked
at any time).

- 13 -

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this

y

da

y

of

March, 1993.
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

76-3-203. Felony conviction — Indeterminate term of imprisonment — Increase of sentence if firearm
used.
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of thefirstdegree, for a term at not less than
five years, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may
be for life but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the
representation of afirearmwas used in the commission or furtherance of
the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a
teqp of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate
term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently;
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term at not less
than one year nor more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a
firearm or a facsimile or the representation of afirearmwas used in the
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and
not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently;
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term not to exceed
five years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the
representation of afirearmwas used in the commission or furtherance of
the felony, the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and
not concurrently.

76-5-102. Assault
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to
do bodily izyury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.

76-5-103. Aggravated assault
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined
in Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another, or
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) Aggravated assault is a third degree felony.

Rule 19. Instructions.
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably directs, any party may file written request that the court instruct the
jury on the law as set forth in the request. At the same time copies of such
requests shall be furnished to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel
of its proposed action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a
copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such instructions may be given orally, or otherwise waive this requirement
(b) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court
shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part
refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of
the charge was given and what part was refused.
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions
in order to avoid a manifest injustice.
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court
refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the
exclusive judges of all questions of fact.
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has
instructed the jury. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon
time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court.

Rule 103. Rulings on evidence.
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground
of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was
apparent from the context within which questions were asked.
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making
of an offer in question and answer form.
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof
or asking questions in the hearing of the jury.
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of
the court.

ADDENDUM B

INSTRUCTION NO.

7

A person commits Aggravated Assault if that person commits
assault and

(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to

another; or (b) uses a dangerous weapon or other means or force
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
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ADDENDUM C

INSTRUCTION NO.

*-«•?

Before you can convict the defendant, Francisco Tinoco, of
the offense of Aggravated Assault# a lesser included offense of
Count

I

evidence

of

the

Information,

fails to establish

you

must

have

found

that

the

one or more of the elements of

Attempted Criminal Homicide, Murder beyond a reasonable doubt,
and you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt,
each and every one of the following elements of that offense:
1.
Lake

That on or about the 21st day of April of 1992 in Salt

County,

State

of Utah,

the

defendant

Francisco

Tinoco

assaulted Jesus Rodriguez; and
2.

That he did so by the use of a dangerous weapon or

other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily
injury;
3.

That

the

said

defendant

did

so

recklessly,

intentionally or knowingly; and
4.

That the defendant did so unlawfully and without legal

justification.
If, after careful consideration of all the evidence in this
case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one of
the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
find that the defendant guilty of the offense of Aggravated
Assault,

a

information.

lesser

included

offense

of

If, on the other hand,

you

Count
are

not

I

of

the

convinced

beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing
elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of Count I.

ADDENDUM D

INSTRUCTION NO,

-A

"Assault" is:
(a)

an attempt, with unlawful force or violence,

to do bodily injury to another; or
(b)

a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate

force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or
(c)

an

act,

committed

with

unlawful

force

or

violence, that causes bodily injury to another.
"Bodily

injury"

means

physical

pain,

illness

or

an

impairment of physical condition.
"Dangerous weapon" means any item capable of causing death
or serious bodily injury, or a facsimile or representation of the
item, and:
(a)
the item

the actor's use or apparent intended use of
leads the victim to reasonably

believe the

item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury;
or
(b)

the actor represents to the victim verbally

or in any other manner that the actor is in control of
such an item.
"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or
causes

serious

impairment

permanent

disfigurement,

protracted

of the function of any bodily member

loss

or

or organ, or

creates a substantial risk of death.
"Unlawful or unlawfully" means that which is contrary to law
or unauthorized
illegal.

by

law,

or, without

legal

justification,

or,

